from the desk of:

Bob Hogan

Director of Burlington’s Office of Veterans Services

November History Story

Korea, November 1950

Every month has some important military history. November is no exception. We begin this story in October 1950.

Given authority on 6 October to pursue the North Koreans (NK) across the 38th parallel, United Nations forces drove north. Republic Of Korea (ROK) I Corps advanced up the east coast. X Corps embarked at Inchon and Pusan for another amphibious assault. EUSAK's I Corps entered Pyongyang on 19 October. The 187th Airborne RCT dropped 30 miles beyond.

ROK's reached the Yalu at Chosin on 26 October. X Corps landed on the east coast and pushed towards the Yalu. By the end of October the surviving NK army was fighting mainly guerilla actions. 135,000 prisoners had been taken. But veteran Chinese (CCF) troops had crossed the Yalu and had already struck overextended UN units. While EUSAK consolidated along the Chongchon, X Corps reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin, ROK I Corps pushed into the northeast corner of Korea 60 miles from Siberia. The British 29th Commonwealth Brigade, a battalion from Thailand, and South African air units arrived in Korea.

Generals at The Yalu River. 11/21/50 From L to R, Generals Kiefer, Hodes, Almond, & Barr.   http://www.veteranshour.com/koreapg2.htm

The CCF entered the Korean War with a short, violent probing offensive. Although elements of three CCF Armies ... the 38th, 39th, and 40th ... were in place, apparently only about 30,000 CCF foot infantry were mainly deployed. These veteran troops, directed by skillful patrol actions and experienced planning, wreaked devastation among our unprepared and disorganized forces. They destroyed the ROK 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments and also inflicted about 800 casualties on our 8th Cavalry Regiment and capturing over half their equipment while smashing us back.

The CCF tactics were strange to us, they being extremely effective by night and by infiltration and highly effective roadblocks. Even their methods of communications, such as the whistles used in small-unit assault above, seemed eerie and helped demoralize many of our troops.

On November 5, the CCF broke off contact to evaluate the results of their attack and the capabilities of their enemies. This was misunderstood by the UN High Command, who fatally underestimated both the strength and the intent of the CCF forces facing them. After re-grouping, Eighth Army again formed on the Chongchon River, and prepared to launch a general assault on November 25, an assault to get our forces "home for Christmas."

In retrospect, this was an incredible, incomprehensible blunder.

 Seemingly thinking that victory was at hand, MacArthur announced on 24 November the final drive to the northernmost limit of the Korean peninsula.

In retrospect it seems obvious that after China's 1st Phase Offensive we should have stopped for the winter, forming a defensible line across the narrow peninsula neck from Pyongyang to Wonsan, which would have won the war. But, when the CCF broke off to evaluate the results of their first attack and re-group for their next, MacArthur underestimated both China's strength and intent, and sent us on.  The error was fatal.

The only defeat suffered by the CCF in their 1st Phase assault came at the hands of the Seventh Marines, in Sudong Gorge on the east coast above Wonsan. From November 2-7 the Marines relieved the retreating ROK 26th Regiment, met and destroyed the CCF 124th Division in savage close-up combat. The 1st Marine Air Wing had inflicted terrible casualties on the 124th Division, but CCF prisoners said Marine mortars and supporting artillery inflicted even more. In the final analysis, the Marine infantry, fighting man to man, determined the outcome.

November 2, 1950, CCF Prisoners of Seventh Marine Regiment. These prisoners were taken on November 2, and look to be tough fighting men. That was certainly the case with the 124th in general. The Marines were just tougher. http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/CCFPrisonersSeventhMarines.htm

As a direct consequence of this lone defeat, the CCF determined during their evaluation after the 1st Phase assault to target the entire 1st Marine Division when they resumed their attacks. This led to the savagery of the Chosin Reservoir battles.

The men of the 1st Marine division and the 7th Army division were separated from 8th Army by 80 miles of mountains but faced the same dangers. The only difference was how they faced these dangers. It has to be remembered that these men had not only to put up with fighting but had to do so in temperatures that were below zero, sometimes as much as 20 degrees below. By November 25th the 5th and 7th Marines were at the Chosin Reservoir, less than 100 miles from the Manchurian border. Most of the 7th division had reached the Yalu River, the border between the two countries.  

On the 27th the Marines started moving northward, unaware that there were upwards of 100,000 Chinese troops deployed in the area. The division was hit this night all along its length. There wasn't a unit that wasn't under a nightlong series of assaults. Where dawn broke, not one of these units had broken. Every attack had been repulsed, and this was a newly formed unit of which a large part was reservists.  

When the fighting eased up on the 28th,the Marines found themselves defending three separate perimeters; Hagaru on the tip of Chosin Reservoir, Yudam Ni further to the north, and Koto Ri,10 miles south of Hagaru.

The scope of the disaster that befell the Americans (7th Div) above the Chosin became apparent to the Marines when the remnants of the 32 Regimental Combat Team (Task Force Faith) began straggling across the ice of the reservoir. They had been fighting and retreating for three days ,since the 27th,and had lost 1,500 men. It was named Task Force Faith, after the man who had taken command when the C.O. was killed. Only a small amount of the survivors were fit to take part in the defense of Hagaru.

Almond and Smith disagreed on how the pull back would take place. Almond wanted the Marines to retreat immediately, leaving their equipment. Smith said no, they'd take everything with them that they came in with. Smith won out.

Bob Hogan is the Burlington & Bedford Director of Veterans Services. He can be contacted by calling 781-270-1959 in Burlington, MA and 781-275-1328 in Bedford, MA.